The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (CEC, a) portrays the territory of the European Union (EU) as unbalanced. In so doing it invokes what has been described as the most important spatial 'storyline' in EU policy making, '… the need to proactively counterbalance the negative effects of increased inter-European competitiveness brought about by the Single Market and globalization more generally' (Peters, , ) . This paper discusses polycentrism standing for more balanced development conducive for what is now being described as territorial cohesion and shows that the ESDP envisages polycentrism to be achieved through a polycentric process involving many stakeholders. The paper then presents the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a delivery mechanism for territorial cohesion (Faludi, ) . Pursuing hints in the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, a; DG Regio, ), the paper gives a scenario of the application of a form of OMC involving Member States and the Commission, but also transnational regions. The background is the refusal of the Commission ever since the early s to continue its support for the ESDP process. However, as the 'Introduction' to this issue shows, that process may be heading for a revival in the framework of territorial cohesion policy, and this paper discusses how this might be brought about.
Polycentrism according to the ESDP
Polycentrism has been described as a 'bridging concept' (Waterhout, ) holding '… something in stock for everyone ' (Peters, , ) . In this respect it resembles territorial cohesion discussed in the Introduction. It addresses balanced and sustainable development of the territory of the EU invoked in the subtitle of the ESDP. As regards the territory of the EU overall -the 'mega-level of polycentrism' (Davoudi, , ) and the focus of this paper -polycentrism figures immediately in Option  presented in Chapter  of the ESDP on 'Policy aims and options for the territory of the EU'. Here the ESDP recommends strengthening '… several larger zones of global economic integration in the EU, equipped with high-quality, global functions and services, including the peripheral areas, through transnational spatial development strategies' (CEC, a, ) . This is the principal recommendation designed to mitigate imbalances in Europe with '… only one outstanding larger geographical zone of global economic integration: the core area of the EU, the pentagon defined by the metropolises of London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg' (CEC, a, ). Here  per cent of the inhabitants of the EU living on  per cent of its territory produce no less than  per cent of the EU's total gross domestic product (GDP). Delineating the pentagon in only slightly different ways, the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, a, ) regurgitates this argument (DG Regio, ).
The ESDP points out that the EU territory '… differs from that of the USA with several outstanding economic integration zones on a global scale: West Coast (California), East Coast, Southwest (Texas), Mid West' (CEC, a, ). So the territory of the USA is more balanced, giving it a competitive advantage. Therefore, polycentrism, meaning more global economic integration zones outside the pentagon, … has to be pursued, to ensure regionally balanced development, because the EU is becoming fully integrated in the global economy. Pursuit of this concept will help to avoid further excessive economic and demographic concentration in the core area of the EU. The economic potential of all regions of the EU can only be utilised through the further development of a more polycentric European settlement structure. The greater competitiveness of the EU on a global scale demands a stronger integration of the European regions into the global economy. (CEC, a, ) Several facets of polycentrism emerge:
• Its contribution to competitiveness (Davoudi, , ; DG Regio, , );
• Its advantages for peripheral as well as core areas, where the latter get relief from congestion;
• The intention of making full use of the potential of Europe; and • Global connectivity for the whole of Europe.
Critics of polycentrism say that through trickle-down effects the least-favoured regions benefit from making core areas even more competitive. However, in the ESDP process, nobody saw fit to argue that policy should favour the core. Rather, competitiveness according to the ESDP has to be 'balanced' (see Tewdwr-Jones and Mourato in this issue), thus reaffirming polycentrism. It has been articulated early on, invoking the concept of the 'European Bunch of Grapes' by Kunzmann and Wegener (; ) as a counterfactual to the 'Blue Banana'.
Polycentrism is being pursued in ESDP follow ups, starting with a document produced by the French Presidency in . A more balanced Europe is necessary since hyper-concentration results in diseconomies such as congestion, pollution, property inflation and negative impacts on peripheral areas (French Presidency, ). For decades, French planning has favoured polycentric development to counterbalance the influence of Paris, put into the limelight by Gravier () in his book Paris et le désert français. A study for DATAR (Délegation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale), Aménager la France de ' (Guigou, ), once again promotes polycentrism. French regions should not orient themselves exclusively to Paris, but also to the wider 'petites europe' of which they form part (Guigou, , ; Peyrony, ).
Some INTERREG IIC projects have picked up the gauntlet thrown down to peripheral regions to set themselves up as new economic integration zones. In its spatial vision document, the North Sea Cooperation Area presents itself as such (NorVISION, ). Similar ambitions exist for the Irish Sea Area (Kidd et al., , -). More initiatives are expected from central and eastern European regions wanting to form counterweights to the north-west European core.
What in more concrete terms might a polycentric Europe look like? The French Presidency document of  has explored this question (see also Baudelle et al., ; Baudelle and Guy, ). A one-time participant of the ESDP process, Mehlbye () also gives glimpses of the shape of the new geography of Europe, an issue that the ESDP has not dared to tackle because of its high political sensitivity (Faludi and Waterhout, , -). A report by the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR, ) also shows what a determined policy might achieve between now and  in terms of polycentrism. Last but not least, an ESPON (European Spatial Planning Observation Network) project (see van Gestel and Faludi in this issue) is about polycentrism.
The academic literature, too, pays attention to polycentricity, but the attitude is sceptical. Davoudi (, ) describes it as one of the least clear concepts in the ESDP. Krätke (, ) questions '… the real control capacity … [of] European spatial development and urban policy makers when they are confronted with the economic forces of spatial organisation'. Peters (, ) deconstructs the spatial 'storylines' that justified EU transport infrastructure investments, and polycentrism is considered to be one of them. She shows that the concept of polycentrism suffers from contradictions. So the jury is still out on polycentrism as an analytical concept, but for this paper this is neither here nor there. Polycentrism is able to rally support and is sure to be invoked in cohesion policy.
A polycentric process
The ESDP did demonstrate the need for European spatial development policy, but Member States insisted that it should be intergovernmental, so upon completion of the ESDP the Commission ended its support. With the arrival of Commissioner Michel Barnier, it put its money on territorial cohesion policy. The 'Introduction' to this issue has already discussed territorial cohesion in the Constitution. It addresses themes like those in the ESDP, in particular polycentrism. Thus, the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, b) and the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, a; DG Regio, ) describe the EU as monocentric and emphasise the need to make better use of the potential of all regions. So with no alternative in sight, once the dust over the Constitution has settled a revamped ESDP process under the flag of territorial cohesion policy seems set to continue pursuing polycentrism. Here the paper explores the process by which this will be done.
As indicated, the ESDP suggests promoting global economic integration zones outside the pentagon. They should form the object of transnational spatial development strategies. However, it does not propose that the designation of such zones should be done from Brussels. Rather, cooperation and initiatives from below are the key to forming such zones, and thus This intention of mobilising what former Commission President Jacques Delors has been quoted in the Introduction to this issue as calling the forces vives is already evident in the procedures of the Structural Funds. Indeed, this may be said to be one of the cornerstones of cohesion policy, and the policy in the ESDP as regards global economic integration zones comes in the same mould. In other words, global economic integration zones are envisaged as what the French call 'territorial projects'. Member State governments would of course be only too welcome to join, but regions and major cities are expected to take the initiative. So one can only agree with Meijers and Romein () where they say that there is more to polycentrism than the morphology of the urban system:
Rather, an active building of regional organising capacity is needed -that is, the ability to regionally coordinate developments through a more or less institutionalised framework of cooperation, debate, negotiation and decision making in pursuit of interests at the regional scale -to shape a polycentric urban region's competitive advantages. (Meijers and Romein, , )
The ESDP thus issues a challenge to actors in all corners of Europe to advance their positions by networking. As indicated, some have already picked up the gauntlet. There is also the Lisbon strategy of turning Europe into the most competitive area of sustainable growth in the world by . Thus, the new agenda, also for the Structural Funds, includes a concern (already reflected in the ESDP) for the competitiveness of Europe, and not just for imbalances. This is enforced by the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, a) with Lisbon written all over it. An albeit small share ( per cent) of Community funds -the reshaped Objective  (restructuring and job creation) and the new Objective  (promoting cooperation and networking) -should go, not to leastfavoured regions, but to others to improve competitiveness and cooperation.
The Open Method of Coordination
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is one of the novel governance modes touted by the White Paper on European Governance (CEC, a). There, the Commission argues that power in the EU should be exercised in an open, participatory, accountable, effective and coherent fashion. For this the so-called 'Community Method' by which the Commission makes proposals for the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament to approve before they become European law needs to be supplemented with less top-down approaches and non-legislative instruments. In an earlier paper, the present author has argued that one of these methods, the OMC, seems ideally suited for putting territorial cohesion policy as a shared competence of the Union and the Member States, into practice (Faludi, ).
Applying OMC is what DATAR proposed in early . The Commission seems lukewarm. As the introduction has made clear, a shared competence implies that at long last the Community Method can be applied in territorial cohesion policy (see Janin Rivolin in this issue). However, the Commission would be well advised to consider the OMC. In fact, the way in which the Commission in its latest proposals suggests shaping the delivery mechanisms of cohesion policy (see the Introduction) will be shown to resemble the OMC.
The OMC received an official blessing at the Lisbon Summit of March . It is being described as the 'third way' in EU governance '… to be used when harmonisation is unworkable but mutual recognition and the resulting regulatory competition may have unwelcome consequences' (Mosher and Trubek, , ). The OMC is tolerant of diversity and initiates learning by means of exchanges of best practices, the use of benchmarking, target setting, periodic reporting and multilateral surveys. A key feature is its decentralised character.
In fact, Lisbon gave a name to procedures adopted in formulating the European Employment Strategy and general social policy. These procedures in turn reflect those applied previously in monetary policy where the 'Stability and Growth Pact' has led to 'Broad Economic Policy Guidelines' being issued by the Commission. As against the Stability and Growth Pact, these guidelines do not pose rigid requirements, '… but rather, softer recommendations for which sanctions take the form of peer pressure, of financial markets, or of public opinion' (De la Porte and Pochet, , ).
The OMC shows that the discussion (central also to the ESDP process; see Faludi and Waterhout, ) between a supranational and an intergovernmental logic can be bracketed. This relates to the broader debate about the nature of European integration and what it means for national sovereignty. Old distinctions are becoming redundant. New conceptualisations are needed to take account of a reality in which Community institutions, Member States and sub-national governments and other stakeholders operate side by side. The OMC is one of the labels given to processes of mutual learning. The emphasis is on the interaction between Community institutions and Member States (Gore, , ). Interaction across levels, including regional and local actors, is addressed through the concept of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks, ).
Atkinson (, ) points out that the development of the ESDP, and also of the urban policy of the Community through initiatives like URBAN I and II, the Urban Exchange Initiative and the Urban Audit, already operate along the lines of OMC. There is Community competence for neither the ESDP nor urban policies; hence the Community method does not apply. Similarly to the European Employment Strategy, the ESDP has been prepared by the Committee for Spatial Development (CSD) chaired by the Member State holding the rotating EU presidency rather than by a proper 'comitology committee'. However, the CSD enjoyed the support of the Commission, as if it was a comitology committee, and the Commission had a strong presence, including a permanent seat on the management committee, or 'troika'. Also, not only ministers of the Member States sanctioned the ESDP, but also the Commissioner responsible for regional policy at the time. To the extent of referring to it whenever possible, the Commission may also be said to be committed to the ESDP (Faludi, ).
Yet another similarity between the European Employment Strategy and the ESDP is that the latter is binding on neither the Member States nor the Commission. However, there is also one glaring difference. There has been a lack of high-level political support for the ESDP. Since the French minister Jacques Chérèque and his friend, Commission President Jacques Delors, threw their weight in behind the idea at the beginning of the ESDP process in  (Faludi and Waterhout, , -), no senior politician has stuck his or her neck out for it. Rather, the ESDP progressed thanks to the efforts of expert planners in the various administrations, including the Commission.
A scenario
The discussion here aims to outline a scenario of the application of OMC to territorial cohesion policy. This will be based on three key assumptions. First of all, that the Commission will announce its intention of presenting Community strategic guidelines on cohesion before  (as reported in the Introduction of this special issue). There is a further assumption that this will include (although perhaps not under this name) what we might call a European Territorial Cohesion Strategy embracing, as seems most likely, polycentrism. After all, polycentrism has met with universal approval. The final assumption is that in developing European Territorial Cohesion Strategy the Commission would decide to invoke the OMC.
As indicated, at present this is not explicit Commission policy. At a meeting of directors-general of planning of the EU  in Paris on  May , a Commission representative spoke out against the OMC. However, what is the alternative? Applying the Community method to produce a kind of framework directive? This can hardly be done without Member State involvement. The Commission can never obtain the data nor gain acceptance for any framework it proposes without prior consultations. It is for this reason that in territorial cohesion policy (building perhaps, as van Gestel and Faludi argue elsewhere in this issue, on experiences gained in operating ESPON) the OMC would come into its own.
In order to draw benefit from their expertise, the Commission should invite each Member State first of all to formulate a Territorial Cohesion Action Plan or a similar document. Naturally, in so doing each Member State would draw on its existing national policy. Perhaps, for the sake of comparability, some standardisation of the format would be useful. Member States are unlikely to object because this would be a step proposed in the ESDP which all Member States have supported where it suggests that each should provide standardised annual reports on the spatial development of their territories (CEC, a, ).
The Territorial Cohesion Action Plans would have a dual purpose:
• to provide inputs for the European Territorial Cohesion Strategy; and • to form the basis for mutual reviews.
The reviews by panels of experts from other Member States would be ongoing and decentralised. The Commission would hold the ring, helping with the methodology and procedures developed for this purpose by ESPON, perhaps (as van Gestel and Faludi propose) revamped as a European Territorial Cohesion Assessment Network. The Commission would also provide opportunities for presenting the Territorial Cohesion Action Plans. Once again, maybe the existing set-up of ESPON could be adapted for this purpose. These forums might be called European Territorial Cohesion Forums. They would be occasions also for presenting the Commission's own proposals for a European Territorial Cohesion Strategy, being part of the preparation and/or the further elaboration of the strategic document which in the Third Cohesion Report it has announced the intention of publishing.
Obviously, in formulating the European Territorial Cohesion Strategy, the Commission would seek to take account of the position of Member States. Clearly, just as in the ESDP process, the polycentric process represented by the OMC would be a safeguard for a polycentric outcome. Based on the European Territorial Cohesion Strategy, the Commission might make recommendations to Member States. However, as in employment, social security and so forth, they would not be binding.
The above suggestions could easily be fitted into Commission proposals for the delivery mechanisms of cohesion policy (see the Introduction), rendering them more specific as regards the (as yet somewhat vague) territorial dimension of that policy. Significantly, the Commission itself forges links with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy, policy areas in which the OMC is being applied. Also, the Commission itself proposes annual national plans, regular reporting, the use of indicators, and so forth. The process of formulating and reformulating cohesion policy would have features of the OMC, even if that were not to be how it is called.
However, in some respects for the purpose of territorial cohesion policy, the process needs to be modified, also as regards existing examples of the application of OMC. Economic policy, employment policy and social security are primarily matters of national concern. Territorial cohesion is different. Regional and local governments need to be involved which is also why Community regional policy insists on their participation. Talking about spatial development rather than territorial cohesion policy, the ESDP says the same, namely that 'A successful spatial development policy… depends far more on cooperation with the local and regional levels than in other policy areas' (CEC, a, ).
Perkmann (, ) points out that there is increasing scope for regional and local governments to cooperate across borders. Encouraged by the Commission and its Community Initiative INTERREG, non-central governments have formed many cross-border and transnational networks. As will be remembered, the ESDP expects global economic integration zones, among others, to emerge from such transnational cooperation. So for the purpose of territorial cohesion policy one should not think of a European Union neatly divided into the territories of its members. Rather, one should see the EU territory for what it is -a jumble of overlapping fields of action crosscutting national boundaries and bringing together actors from various levels. For the purposes of preparing territorial cohesion policy, the circle of participants needs to be wider, therefore, than just the Member States. It must include cross-border regions.
Surely though, not all cross-border regions could be involved. As of , Perkmann (, -) counts no less than  - of which with a predominantly local character. He notes the influence of EU regional policy but makes no specific reference to INTERREG. What he must have in mind is the cross-border strand, called INTERREG IIA/IIIA. He does not mention INTERREG IIC, now IIIB, introduced in the wake of the ESDP. The cooperation areas under INTERREG IIC/ IIIB in particular should form the framework for the participation of non-central governments and other relevant stakeholders in territorial cohesion policy.
The intention has been for spatial visions to be formulated for each of these cooperation areas. These spatial visions should advance and deepen the ESDP agenda. Only some such visions have actually seen the light of day (Nadin, ) and the emphasis on spatial visions has somewhat receded into the background under INTERREG IIIB. However, there are another two years to go before the end of this programming period, which would allow vision projects in the making (e.g. for northwest Europe, the Atlantic space and the western Mediterranean) to be brought to a successful conclusion. Such visions, with special attention to the emergence of global economic integration zones, are what would be needed in territorial cohesion policy. (See also Zonneveld and Waterhout in this issue.) At European Territorial Cohesion Forums, the visions per cooperation area -the 'petites europe' -would form important inputs, supplementing and to some extent counterbalancing the visions of Member States as laid down in their Territorial Cohesion Action Plans.
In these terms, the application of the OMC in territorial cohesion policy would involve a confrontation between visions of Europe as a whole, visions pertaining to the 'petites europe', as well as the spatial visions of individual Member States.
Conclusions
In this polycentric process, many interpretations of territorial cohesion would thus rub off on one another. Each one would serve to improve the understanding of the spatial positions of the actors concerned. As is its calling, the European Commission would be thinking in terms of the Union as a whole. The administrations of Member States and the actors forming networks of cooperation in the 'petites europe' would be articulating visions as seen from their corners of Europe. Naturally, these various visions would diverge. Nonetheless, they would all be valid in their own terms. European spatial visioning should not be loaded in favour of an agreed, overall vision. Indeed, none of the visions, not even that one put forward by the Commission, should be regarded as authoritative.
Clearly, visioning as portrayed here would be a complex affair. This is the price to be paid for the ambition of formulating a European Territorial Cohesion Strategy. The expectation should not be one of an unequivocal outcome, of one agreed view of where Europe is, or should be, going. It would be more realistic to expect multiple perspectives that cannot be wholly reconciled. This would be a true reflection of the diversity of Europe, something that the ESDP rightly praises in its opening sentence (CEC, a, ) and which the new Constitution promises to uphold. This diversity should be reflected in territorial cohesion policy as a polycentric process. Territorial cohesion policy is not to be confused with the pursuit of an elusive European masterplan.
